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How would you feel if you won an award for outstanding 
professional achievement? How would you feel if your 
marriage broke apart? Intuitively, answers to these ques-
tions are important, as they should predict your actions. 
If the prospect of losing your spouse does not fill you 
with negative feelings, you may not attempt to keep your 
marriage intact. But how exactly do feelings associated 
with possible outcomes relate to actual choices? What are 
the computational rules by which feelings are trans-
formed into decisions? While an expanding body of lit-
erature has been dedicated to answering the reverse 
question, namely how decision outcomes affect feelings 
(Carter & McBride, 2013; Kassam, Morewedge, Gilbert, & 
Wilson, 2011; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 
2006; McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman, & Schkade, 2010; 
Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Rutledge, Skandali, 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Yechiam, Telpaz, & Hochman, 
2014), little is known about how feelings drive decisions 
about potential outcomes.
In the present study, we examined whether feelings 
predict choice and built a computational model that 
specified this relationship. We turned to prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 
1992) as a starting point in this research. Prospect theory 
was not derived by eliciting people’s feelings to predict 
choice, but rather by observing people’s choices in order 
to estimate the subjective value associated with possible 
outcomes. An implicit assumption of the theory, how-
ever, is that subjective value (utility) is a proxy for feel-
ings, which in turn govern choice; “humans described by 
Prospect Theory are guided by the immediate emotional 
impact of gains and losses” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 287). 
This suggests that if one measures a person’s feelings 
associated with different outcomes, one should be able 
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Abstract
Intuitively, how you feel about potential outcomes will determine your decisions. Indeed, an implicit assumption 
in one of the most influential theories in psychology, prospect theory, is that feelings govern choice. Surprisingly, 
however, very little is known about the rules by which feelings are transformed into decisions. Here, we specified 
a computational model that used feelings to predict choices. We found that this model predicted choice better than 
existing value-based models, showing a unique contribution of feelings to decisions, over and above value. Similar 
to the value function in prospect theory, our feeling function showed diminished sensitivity to outcomes as value 
increased. However, loss aversion in choice was explained by an asymmetry in how feelings about losses and gains 
were weighted when making a decision, not by an asymmetry in the feelings themselves. The results provide new 
insights into how feelings are utilized to reach a decision.
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to generate that person’s utility function and use it to 
predict his or her choices. While prospect theory is one 
of the most influential theories in economics and psy-
chology, this implicit assumption has never been empiri-
cally tested. Thus, it is not known if and how feelings 
guide choice.
To address this question, we conducted three studies, 
in which we asked participants to report how they felt or 
expected to feel after winning or losing different amounts 
of money (the main study is presented here and the two 
extension and replication studies are presented in the 
Supplemental Material available online). We used those 
self-reported feelings to create a feeling function, a func-
tion that best relates feelings (expected or experienced) 
to objective value. Next, we used this function to predict 
participants’ choices in a different decision-making task. 
Our findings were replicated in all three studies.
An intriguing question was what such a feeling func-
tion would look like. One possibility is that it would 
resemble the value function in prospect theory, which 
relates the subjective value estimated from choice data to 
objective value. First, for most people, the value function 
is steeper for losses than for gains. This results in loss 
aversion, such that the absolute subjective value of losing 
a dollar is greater than that of winning a dollar. Yet while 
it appears that “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979, p. 279), it is not known whether 
the impact of a loss on one’s feelings is greater than the 
impact of an equivalent gain. Alternatively, it is possible 
that the impact of gains and losses on feelings is similar 
but that the weight given to those feelings differs when 
one makes a choice.
Second, prospect theory’s value function is convex in 
the loss domain while concave in the gain domain (such 
that it resembles an S). The curvature of the function in 
both domains represents the notion of diminishing sensi-
tivity to changes in value as gains and losses increase. In 
other words, the subjective value of gaining (or losing) 
$10 is smaller than twice that of gaining (or losing) $5. 
This diminishing sensitivity results in risk aversion in the 
gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain, with 
individuals tending to choose a small sure gain over a 
high but risky gain, but a high risky loss over a small sure 
loss. We examined whether our feeling function was also 
concave for gains and convex for losses, which would 
imply that similar to subjective value, feelings associated 
with gains and losses are less sensitive to outcome value 
as gains and losses increase. That is, the impact of win-
ning (or losing) $10 on feelings is less than twice the 
impact of winning (or losing) $5.
Once feelings were modeled using this feeling func-
tion, we asked whether they could predict choice. Under-
standing how explicit feelings relate to behavior has 
important real-world implications for domains ranging 
from policy to industry.
Method
Participants
Fifty-nine healthy volunteers (24 males, 35 females; mean 
age = 23.94 years, age range 19–35) from the University 
College London Subject Pool were recruited to take part 
in the experiment. Sample size was determined using a 
power analysis (G*Power Version 3.1.9.2; Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) based on previous studies that 
have investigated the link between decision outcomes 
and self-reported feelings using within-subjects designs. 
Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) in those studies ranged from 
0.245 to 0.798, with a mean of 0.401 (Harinck, Van Dijk, 
Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007; Kermer et  al., 2006; 
Yechiam et al., 2014). We determined that a sample size 
of 59 participants would achieve 85% power to detect an 
effect size of 0.401 with an alpha of .05.
Three participants were excluded: 1 whose feeling rat-
ings showed no variation at all, 1 whose data from the 
gambling task were lost, and 1 who failed to complete 
more than 50% of the trials in the gambling task. Final 
analyses were therefore run on 56 participants (22 males, 
34 females; mean age = 23.91 years, age range 19–35). All 
participants gave written informed consent and were 
paid for their participation. All started the experiment 
with an initial endowment of £12 and were paid accord-
ing to their choices on two randomly chosen trials (across 
the two tasks) at the end of the experiment. The experi-
ment was approved by the departmental ethics commit-
tee at University College London.
Behavioral tasks
Participants completed two tasks, the feelings task and the 
gambling task, the order of which was counterbalanced.
Feelings task. In the feelings task, participants com-
pleted four blocks of 40 to 48 trials each, in which they 
reported either expected (Fig. 1a) or experienced (Fig. 
1b) feelings associated with a range of wins and losses 
(between £0.2 and £12) or with no change in monetary 
amount (£0). At the beginning of each trial, participants 
were told how much was at stake and whether it was a 
win trial (e.g., “If you choose the GOOD picture, you 
will: WIN £10”) or a loss trial (e.g., “If you choose the 
BAD picture, you will: LOSE £10”). On each trial, their 
task was to make a simple arbitrary choice between two 
different geometrical shapes. Participants were told that 
one stimulus was randomly associated with a gain or loss 
(between £0.2 and £12) and the other stimulus with no 
gain and no loss (£0). Each stimulus was presented only 
once across the entire task so there was no way for par-
ticipants to learn which stimulus was associated with a 
better outcome. The probability of sampling each amount 
was controlled to ensure that each gain and each loss 
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from the range was sampled twice in each block: In one 
instance, the outcome was the amount at stake (win/loss), 
and in the other, the outcome was £0 (no win/no loss).
In two of the four blocks (counterbalanced order), 
participants reported their expected feelings prior to 
choosing between the two stimuli (Fig. 1a), and in the 
other two blocks, they reported their experienced feel-
ings after choosing between the two stimuli (Fig. 1b). 
Participants reported their expected feelings by answer-
ing one of four questions asking how they would feel if 
they “win,” “lose,” “don’t win,” or “don’t lose” (the order 
of win/lose and don’t-win/don’t-lose questions was 
counterbalanced across trials). In experienced-feelings 
blocks, participants answered the question “How do you 
feel now?” All feelings were rated using a subjective rat-
ing scale ranging from extremely unhappy to extremely 
happy. Expected and experienced feelings were collected 
in different blocks to ensure participants did not simply 
remember and repeat the same rating. The choice 
between the two geometrical shapes was arbitrary and 
implemented simply in order to have participants actively 
involved with the outcomes.
Gambling task. Participants also completed a proba-
bilistic-choice task (Fig. 1c) in which they made 288 to 
322 choices between a risky 50-50 gamble and a sure 
option. Importantly, all the amounts used in the gam-
bling task were the same as those used in the feelings 
task (between £0.2 and £12), so feelings associated with 
these outcomes could be combined to predict gambling 
choice. There were three gamble types: mixed (partici-
pants had to choose between a gamble with a 50% 
chance of a gain and 50% chance of a loss, or a sure 
option of £0), gain only (participants had to choose 
between a gamble with a 50% chance of a high gain and 
a 50% chance of £0, or a sure, smaller gain), and loss 
only (participants had to choose between a gamble with 
50% chance of a high loss and 50% chance of £0, or a 
sure, smaller loss). According to prospect theory, these 
three types of choices are essential to estimate loss aver-
sion, risk preference for gains, and risk preference for 
losses, respectively.
Feeling-function models
The impact of outcome on feelings was calculated rela-
tive to three different baselines: difference from the mid-
point of the rating scale, difference from the rating 
reported on the previous trial (for experienced feelings 
only), and difference from the corresponding zero out-
come. These were calculated for each win and loss 
amount, for expected and experienced feelings sepa-
rately. Using each of the three methods, we fit 20 feeling-
function models (10 for expected feelings and 10 for 
experienced feelings) for each participant to explain how 
feelings best related to value outcomes:
Feeling Model 1: =F x x( ) β
Feeling Model 2: gain
loss
F x
x x
x x
( ) =
>
<



β
β
,
,
0
0
Feeling Model 3: F x
x x
x x
( ) =
>
− <




β
β
ρ
ρ
( ) ,
( ) ,
0
0
Feeling Model 4: 
gain
loss
F x
x x
x x
( ) =
( ) >
− ( ) <




β
β
ρ
ρ
,
,
0
0
Feeling Model 5: 
gain
loss
F x
x x
x x
( ) =
( ) >
− ( ) <




β
β
ρ
ρ
,
,
0
0
Feeling Model 6: 
gain
loss
gain
loss
F x
x x
x x
( ) =
( ) >
− ( ) <
 β
β
ρ
ρ
,
,
0
0



Feeling Model 7: F x
x x
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− <


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β ε
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,
,
0
0
Feeling Model 8: gain
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x x
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− <



β ε
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,
,
0
0
Feeling Model 9: gain
loss
F x
x x
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( ) =
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


β ε
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,
,
0
0
Feeling Model 10: gain gain
loss loss
F x
x x
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( ) =
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,
,
0
0
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

In all these models, x  represents the value (from −12 
to −0.2 for losses and from 0.2 to 12 for gains) and F  the 
associated feeling. The slope between feelings and val-
ues is represented by the parameter β estimated as a 
single parameter in all odd-numbered models, or sepa-
rately for losses and gains in all even-numbered models. 
If loss aversion is reflected in feelings, βloss should be 
significantly greater than βgain, and even-numbered mod-
els should perform better overall. Similar to the curvature 
parameter of the value function in prospect theory, ρ 
reflects the curvature of the feeling function, that is, the 
fact that feelings become more or less sensitive to changes 
in value as absolute value increases (Feeling Models 3 to 
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6). In Feeling Models 5 and 6, the curvature is estimated 
separately in the gain and loss domains. If the feeling 
function is S-shaped (concave function for gains and con-
vex function for losses), ρ values should be significantly 
smaller than 1. To ensure that a function with curvature 
fit the feelings data better than a simple linear function 
with an intercept, we defined Feeling Models 7 to 10 (as 
respective comparisons for Feeling Models 3–6); in these 
models, ε represents the intercept, or the offset (positive 
for gains, negative for losses) where feelings start for val-
ues close to £0. All these models were estimated in 
MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) using a maxi-
mum-likelihood estimation procedure (Myung, 2003). 
Bayesian information criterions (BICs) were calculated 
for each participant and model, and then summed across 
participants (see the Supplemental Material for details). 
Lower BICs indicate better model fit.
Prediction of gambling choice
Feeling values from Feeling Model 3 (found to be the 
most parsimonious model overall) were then used to pre-
dict choices in the gambling task. Specifically, the feeling 
associated with each amount was calculated from Feeling 
Model 3 using each participant’s estimated parameters (β 
and ρ). Thus, for each trial of the gambling task, a feel-
ings value was obtained for the sure option, the gain, and 
the loss presented on that trial. A feelings value of 0 was 
used when the amount in the gambling trial was £0. The 
probability of choosing the gamble on each trial, coded 
as 1 if the gamble was chosen and 0 if the sure option 
was chosen, was then entered as the dependent variable 
of a logistic regression (choice model), with feelings 
associated with the sure option (S, coded negatively in 
order to obtain a positive weight), the gain (G, multiplied 
by its probability .5), and the loss (L, multiplied by its 
probability .5) entered as the three predictor variables:
p
e F F F
gamble
S G L
( ) =
+ ( ) + ( ) + ( )
1
1 –[ ]
,
ω ω ωS G L
where ω is a weight value. For example, if a participant 
were offered a mixed-gamble trial in which he or she could 
choose either a gamble that offered a 50% chance of win-
ning £10 and a 50% chance of losing £6 or a sure option of 
£0, we estimated the feelings associated with these three 
elements multiplied by their probability: the feeling associ-
ated with gaining £10, F(₤10) = β × 10ρ × .5; the feeling 
associated with losing £6, F(–₤6) = β × (–6)ρ × .5, and the 
feeling associated with getting £0: F(₤0) = 0 × 1 = 0.
Logistic regressions were run in MATLAB using the 
glmfit function, using either expected feelings (Choice 
Model 1) or experienced feelings (Choice Model 2). Each 
logistic regression resulted in three weight parameters ω, 
which reflected the weight assigned to feelings when 
making a choice: one for gains (ωG), one for losses (ωL), 
and one for sure options (ωS). To determine whether 
those modeled feelings predicted choice better than 
value-based models, we defined five other comparison 
models. One predicted choice from objective values 
(Choice Model 3), and another predicted choice from the 
log of objective values (consistent with standard eco-
nomics models to account for the curvature of utility—
Choice Model 4). The final three models were derived 
from prospect theory; in these models, value was 
weighted for each participant with his or her loss-aver-
sion parameter (Choice Model 5), risk-aversion parame-
ter (Choice Model 6), or both (Choice Model 7; see the 
Supplemental Material for more details). To avoid circu-
larity and ensure all choice models were run on the same 
set of choice data, we estimated loss- and risk-aversion 
parameters using half the choice data; then, all seven 
choice models, including those in which we used 
extracted feelings rather than values, were run on the 
other half of the choice data.
To compare across conditions and participants, we 
standardized weight values ω using the following equa-
tion (Menard, 2004; Schielzeth, 2010):
′ =ω ωx x
x
y
s
s ,
where ′ωx  is the standardized weight value, ωx the origi-
nal weight for predictor variable x  obtained from the 
regression, sx the standard deviation of variable x, and sy 
the standard deviation of the dependent variable y, here 
the binary choice values. Standardized weight values 
were extracted from each regression and compared using 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
paired-samples t tests.
Replication and extension studies
Two separate studies were conducted to replicate the 
findings and extend them to cases in which the impact of 
a loss and a gain on feelings was evaluated (a) within the 
same trial (Replication and Extension Study 1) and (b) on 
the same unipolar rating scale (Replication and Extension 
Study 2). These studies suggest that the results are robust 
and not driven by these specific factors (see the Supple-
mental Material for details and results).
Results
Our analysis followed two main steps. First, we used par-
ticipants’ reported feelings associated with different mone-
tary outcomes in the feelings task to build a feeling function. 
Specifically, we found the best-fitting computational model 
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to specify how feelings associated with different amounts 
of gains and losses relate to the objective value of these 
amounts. Second, we tested whether that model of feelings 
predicted participants’ choices on the gambling task. 
Results of the main study are reported here, and results of 
the replication and extension studies are reported in the 
Supplemental Material.
Characterizing a feeling function
For all the models described below, the method of com-
puting change from the rating associated with the zero 
outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not winning or 
not losing the equivalent amount) resulted in the best fit 
(Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). Thus, we report 
results using this baseline; however, the results were the 
same when we used the other two methods of calculat-
ing feelings (see the Supplemental Material for details).
The BIC, which penalizes for additional parameters, 
showed that the best-fitting model (i.e., the one with the 
lowest BIC value) for both expected (Fig. 2a) and expe-
rienced (Fig. 2b) feelings was Feeling Model 3 (see Table 
S2 in the Supplemental Material for BIC and R2 values), 
which has one ρ and one β. This suggests two things. 
First, it indicates that feelings’ sensitivity to outcomes 
gradually decreased as outcomes increased. Similar to 
the value function in prospect theory, ρ was significantly 
smaller than 1—expected feelings: ρ = .512, SD = .26, 
95% confidence interval (CI) = [.418, .558], t(55) = −14.05, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.88; experienced feelings: ρ = .425, 
SD = .23, 95% CI = [.513, .637], t(55) = −18.52, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.5—which indicates that the feeling func-
tion was concave in the gain domain and convex in the 
loss domain. Figure 3 shows that the magnitude of feel-
ings associated with £10, for example, was less than twice 
the magnitude of feelings associated with £5. The aver-
age β across participants, which represents the slope of 
the function, was 0.857 (SD = 0.36) for expected feelings 
and 0.819 (SD = 0.37) for experienced feelings.
Second, we found that neither sensitivity (β) nor cur-
vature (ρ) differed for gains and losses. Equal sensitivity 
suggests that when feelings associated with losses and 
gains are evaluated separately, their impact is symmetri-
cal, such that losses are not experienced more intensely 
than gains. On the surface, these findings contradict the 
notion of loss aversion, as proposed by prospect theory. 
However, what we will show later is that while here 
losses do not necessarily affect feelings more than gains, 
they are weighted to a greater extent when making a 
choice. With regards to curvature, a single ρ was more 
parsimonious than two separate ones for gains and 
losses, which suggests that the extent of concavity for 
gains was equivalent to the extent of convexity for losses.
Further support for the observation that feelings’ sen-
sitivity to outcomes gradually decreased as outcomes 
increased came from the fact that all models with a cur-
vature parameter ρ (Feeling Models 3–6) were better fits, 
as indicated by lower BIC values, than corresponding 
linear models with an intercept (Feeling Models 7–10). 
This was true both when comparing BICs for models fit-
ting expected feelings (BIC difference < −112) and expe-
rienced feelings (BIC difference < −37; Table S2). Further 
support for the observation that neither sensitivity nor 
curvature differed between gains and losses came from 
the fact that Feeling Model 3 had lower BICs than other 
curved functions with additional parameters that fit gains 
and losses with separate parameters (Feeling Models 4–6; 
see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material) for both 
expected and experienced feelings. In addition, the abso-
lute impact of losses and gains on ratings of feelings rela-
tive to a zero outcome revealed no difference, F(1, 55) = 
0.01, p = .92, ηp2 = .00018.
Impact bias increases with the amount 
at stake
Interestingly, comparing the functions for experienced and 
expected feelings revealed an impact bias that increased 
with the amounts lost or gained. The impact bias is the 
tendency to expect losses or gains to affect feelings more 
than they actually do (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & 
Wheatley, 1998). Specifically, the curvature (ρ) was smaller 
for the experienced-feeling function relative to the 
expected-feeling function—paired-samples t(55) = 3.31, 
p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.442, 95% CI = [0.034, 0.138], while 
there was no difference in sensitivity values (βs), t(55) = 
0.65, p = .52, Cohen’s d = 0.087, 95% CI = [−0.079, 0.155]. 
Thus, although both expected and experienced feelings 
became less sensitive to outcomes as absolute values of 
loss and gain increased, this diminished sensitivity was 
more pronounced in experience than in expectation. As a 
result, for small amounts of money gained or lost, people’s 
expectations of how they would feel were more likely to 
align with their experience. However, as amounts gained 
or lost increased, people were more likely to overestimate 
the effect of outcomes on their feelings, expecting to be 
affected more by gains and losses than they actually were 
(i.e., the impact bias; Gilbert et al., 1998). The growth of 
the impact bias can be seen in Fig. 3 as the increase in 
separation between the solid line (experienced feelings) 
and the more extreme (i.e., higher for gains, lower for 
losses) dashed line (expected feelings).
Feeling function predicts choice better 
than value-based models
Once we established a function that fit feelings to out-
come value, we turned to the question of how well those 
feelings predict choices, in particular how they are com-
bined and weighted to make a decision.
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Choice Models 1 and 2, in which choice was predicted 
from feelings extracted from the expected- and experi-
enced-feeling function, respectively, predicted choice 
better than all value-based comparison models (Choice 
Models 3–7), as indicated by lower BIC scores (Fig. 4a) 
and higher R2 values (Table S4 in the Supplemental Mate-
rial). Running the split-half analysis 100 times, with a dif-
ferent way to split the data on every iteration, revealed 
that models using feelings predicted choice better than 
all five comparison models in 99 iterations out of 100, 
thus confirming the reliability of this finding.
Feelings associated with losses are  
weighted more than feelings associated  
with gains when decisions are being made
Are feelings about potential losses and gains given equal 
weights when people deliberate on a decision? Our feel-
ing function indicated that the impact of a loss on feel-
ings was equal to the impact of an equivalent gain. Yet 
while losses and gains may affect explicit feelings simi-
larly, we found that these feelings are weighted differ-
ently when people are making a choice.
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feelings to outcome value, separately for (a) expected-feelings ratings and (b) experienced-feelings ratings.
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Specifically, ω parameters from our choice models, 
which predicted choices from feelings, revealed a greater 
weight for feelings associated with losses (ωL) relative to 
feelings associated with gains (ωG ) in predicting choice—
for expected feelings: t(55) = 3.04, p = .004, 95% CI = 
[0.684, 3.33], Cohen’s d = 0.406; for experienced feelings: 
t(55) = 2.93, p = .005, 95% CI = [0.599, 3.19], Cohen’s d = 
0.392 (Fig. 4b). Models that allowed different weights for 
losses and gains performed significantly better than mod-
els that did not (Table S5 in the Supplemental Material).
Follow-up analysis revealed that this was true only in 
mixed-gamble trials, in which losses and gains are 
weighted simultaneously, but not in gain-only and loss-
only trials, in which gains and losses are evaluated at 
different time points (different trials). Specifically, we 
ran logistic regressions to predict choice from feelings 
separately for each trial type, and then entered weight-
of-feelings parameters into a 2 (trial type: mixed, non-
mixed) by 2 (outcome: loss, gain) repeated measures 
ANOVA. This revealed a significant interaction—
expected feelings: F(1, 55) = 6.54, p = .013, ηp2 = .106; 
experienced feelings: F(1, 55) = 7.46, p = .008, ηp2 = .119 
(Fig. S1 in the Supplemental Material)—driven by a 
greater weight put on feelings associated with losses 
relative to feelings associated with gains during mixed-
gamble choices—expected feelings: t(55) = 3.66, p = 
.001, 95% CI = [1.67, 5.71], Cohen’s d = 0.489; experi-
enced feelings: t(55) = 2.45, p = .018, 95% CI = [0.91, 
9.10], Cohen’s d =  0.327—but not during loss- versus 
gain-only trials—expected feelings: t(55) = 0.82, p = .42, 
95% CI = [−3.25, 7.71], Cohen’s d = 0.109; experienced 
feelings: t(55) = 0.79, p = .43, 95% CI = [−2.75, 6.32], 
Cohen’s d = 0.105. In other words, only when potential 
losses and gains are evaluated simultaneously (i.e., in 
the same choice) are feelings about losses weighted 
more strongly than feelings about gains. Results of our 
first replication and extension study further show that 
even when gains and losses were evaluated in the same 
trial during the feelings task, their impact on feelings 
does not differ, but their weight on gambling choices 
does (see the Supplemental Material for details).
To further tease apart the asymmetrical use of feelings 
associated with gains and losses in shaping choice from 
the use of value alone, we ran another logistic regression 
(Choice Model 8) in which raw feelings (i.e., reported 
feelings relative to baseline rather than those derived 
from the feeling function) were added as predictors of 
choice in the same logistic regression as objective values 
themselves. This was done to reveal the weight assigned 
to feelings in making a choice over and beyond the effect 
of value per se, when the two compete. The results 
showed no difference in the weight assigned to the value 
of losses and gains per se, t(55) < 1.2, p > .23, Cohen’s 
d  < .17, only to the weight assigned to the associated 
feelings—expected feelings: t(55) = 3.59, p = .001, 95% 
CI = [1.29, 4.55], Cohen’s d = .479; experienced feelings: 
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Fig. 3. Feeling function. Plotted are expected- and experienced-feelings ratings averaged across participants for each outcome value, as well 
as predictions of the best-fitting model (Feeling Model 3). Feelings ratings are shown as a function of change from baseline (i.e., the rating 
associated with the zero outcome of neither winning nor losing). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
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t(55) = 2.28, p = .027, 95% CI = [0.197, 2.89], Cohen’s d = 
0.307. Again, this was true only for mixed-gamble choices, 
not for gain-only or loss-only trials, in which neither feel-
ings nor values were weighted differently between losses 
and gains (Table S6 in the Supplemental Material). This 
suggests that losses are not weighted differently from 
gains; rather, feelings associated with losses and with 
gains are weighted differently, which emphasizes the 
importance of feelings in decision making.
This last conclusion raises the possibility that individ-
ual differences in decision making could be explained by 
how people weigh feelings when making a choice. 
Indeed, using the weights from Choice Model 8, we 
found that, controlling for value, individual differences in 
both loss aversion and the propensity to choose gambles 
were directly correlated with the extent to which feelings 
associated with losses were overweighted compared with 
feelings associated with gains—correlation between loss 
aversion and loss-gain weight difference for expected 
feelings: r(56) = .56, p < .001; for experienced feelings: 
r(56) = .34, p = .012; correlation between propensity to 
gamble and loss-gain weight difference for expected feel-
ings: r(56) = −.61, p < .001; for experienced feelings: 
r(56) = −.46, p < .001 (Fig. 5; see the Supplemental Mate-
rial for loss-aversion modeling). Specifically, participants 
who weighted feelings associated with losses more than 
feelings associated with gains were more loss averse and 
less likely to gamble.
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This set of results suggests that the asymmetric influ-
ence of gains and losses on decision making, as sug-
gested by prospect theory, is not necessarily reflected in 
expected or experienced feelings, or in different weights 
assigned to value per se, but rather in the extent to which 
feelings associated with losses and gains are taken into 
account when one makes a decision.
Discussion
The relationship between people’s feelings and the 
choices they make has occupied scientists, policymakers, 
and philosophers for decades. Indeed, in recent years, 
numerous studies have investigated how decisions and 
outcomes affect people’s feelings (Carter & McBride, 
2013; Kassam et al., 2011; Kermer et al., 2006; McGraw 
et  al., 2010; Mellers et  al., 1997; Rutledge et  al., 2014; 
Yechiam et al., 2014) and life satisfaction (Boyce, Wood, 
Banks, Clark, & Brown, 2013; De Neve et al., 2015). Yet 
the equally critical question of how people’s explicit feel-
ings affect their decisions has been relatively neglected. 
In this study, we addressed this important question in a 
controlled laboratory setting and modeled how feelings 
are integrated into decisions. We demonstrated that feel-
ings drive the decisions people make. However, the rules 
by which they do so differ from those that were previ-
ously assumed.
Our feeling model predicted choice better than objec-
tive values did, and a unique contribution of feelings in 
the decision process was demonstrated. The feeling func-
tion that best related feelings to value was revealed to be 
concave for gains and convex for losses, much as the 
value function in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and other nonlinear 
utility functions (Bernoulli, 1954; Fox & Poldrack, 
2014; Stauffer, Lak, & Schultz, 2014; Von Neumann & 
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Morgenstern, 1947). This curvature suggests that explicit 
feelings, similar to subjective value or utility, show dimin-
ishing sensitivity to outcomes as the value of these out-
comes increases (Carter & McBride, 2013). In other 
words, when it comes to one’s feelings, the impact of 
winning or losing $10 is less than twice that of winning 
or losing $5.
Our feeling model also revealed no asymmetry 
between gains and losses, which suggests that the impact 
of a loss on feelings is not necessarily greater than the 
impact of an equivalent gain. This finding was replicated 
in two additional studies in which a gain and a loss were 
evaluated at the same time and in which the associated 
feelings about gains and losses were reported using the 
same unipolar scale. We do not suggest that the feelings 
associated with losses and gains will always be symmet-
ric. On the contrary, different stimuli and contexts may 
result in varying asymmetric effects (Harinck et al., 2007; 
McGraw et al., 2010). In particular, in contrast to the find-
ings reported here, a loss-gain asymmetry in feelings has 
been previously reported in a study using a one-shot 
game, in which the stakes consisted of large ($200) hypo-
thetical amounts (McGraw et al., 2010). Our study exam-
ined responses to incentive-compatible, but relatively 
small, gains and losses. It is possible that for higher 
amounts, an asymmetry in feelings would emerge. How-
ever, we speculate that even for large stakes, the feeling 
function may do a better job at predicting choice than 
value alone. That question awaits testing.
Despite this absence of asymmetry in feelings, we 
found that loss aversion was still present in choice (see 
the Supplemental Material for the mean and median sta-
tistics for loss aversion as well as details on the propor-
tions of risky choices), consistent with the predictions of 
prospect theory. Importantly, when participants made a 
decision, a greater weight was put on feelings associated 
with losses relative to gains. Therefore, our finding sug-
gests that even when losses do not affect feelings more 
strongly than gains do, those feelings are weighted more 
when making a choice than feelings about gains. More-
over, the amount by which feelings associated with losses 
are overweighted relative to feelings associated with 
gains when one makes a decision relates to individual 
differences in loss aversion and propensity to gamble.
This finding resolves a long-standing puzzle in which 
loss aversion is often observed in choice but not neces-
sarily in explicit feelings (Harinck et  al., 2007; Kermer 
et al., 2006; McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997). We 
suggest that the asymmetric influence of gains and losses 
on decision making, as suggested by prospect theory, is 
“reflected neither in expected or experienced feelings 
directly, nor in different weights assigned to value per se, 
but” in the extent to which feelings about losses and 
gains are taken into account when people make a deci-
sion. Our result is consistent with the interpretation of an 
increased attention to losses when one makes a choice 
(Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). When losses and gains are 
presented separately in a decision, the feelings associ-
ated with them are weighted in a symmetrical way. How-
ever, when they compete for attention, as is the case in 
mixed gambles, people may allocate more attention to 
the feelings they would derive from the loss than from 
the gain, which leads them to choose in a loss-averse 
manner. It is also possible that people implicitly experi-
ence losses to a greater extent than they experience gains 
(Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), 
but this difference is not exhibited in explicit reports.
Our findings also provide the first demonstration of an 
impact bias that increases with value. Specifically, we 
found that participants’ self-report feelings exhibited an 
impact bias (also called affective-forecasting error), such 
that they expected the emotional impact of an event to 
be greater than it actually turned out to be (Gilbert et al., 
1998; Kermer et al., 2006; Kwong, Wong, & Tang, 2013; 
Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2013; Morewedge & 
Buechel, 2013; Wilson & Gilbert, 2013). Interestingly, this 
impact bias was not constant but increased with value. 
This was because of a stronger curvature of experienced 
feelings relative to expected feelings. In other words, as 
absolute value increased, sensitivity to value diminished 
more quickly for experienced relative to expected feel-
ings. This suggests that as people win or lose more 
money, they are more and more biased toward overesti-
mating the emotional impact of these outcomes.
Our modeling approach provides novel insight into 
how explicit feelings relate to choice. Such understand-
ing is of theoretical importance and also has practical 
implications for policymakers, economists, and clinicians 
who often measure explicit feelings to predict choice 
(Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, & Rees-Jones, 2012, 2014).
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